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INTRODUCTION

CHARLESJ. MEYERS*

This special symposium celebrates the renaissance of classic oil
and gas law, a complex body of jurisprudence, which draws on
torts, contracts, property, and much that is sui generis and which
developed primarily in the first half of the twentieth century with
the rise of the domestic oil and gas industry. To be more specific,
classic oil and gas law is concerned with mineral titles, with
conflicts between surface owners and mineral owners over surface
user, with the drafting and interpretation of oil and gas leases, and
with state conservation regulation from spacing rules to compulsory
unitization orders. It is state law, except for public lands, and it
arises from the effort to discover and produce oil and gas, whether
the controversy is between landowner and operator, adjoining
landowners, operators with interests in the same land, or operators
and the conservation commission. This body of law contrasts
sharply with modern oil and gas law, which is primarily federal
administrative law arising from the desire of the United States
Government to control prices, first of gas in the mid-1950s and then
of oil beginning in 1971. The difference between classic oil and gas
law and the contemporary federal law is, to my mind, the difference
between Wolfgang Mozart and Alban Berg.

As this symposium indicates, the classic law is enjoying a
*LL.B. University of Texas; LL.M., J.S.D. Columbia University; formerly Dean and
Professor of Law, Stanford University; Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Denver, Colorado.
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rebirth while contemporary oil and gas law is entering a decline.
The explanation is not hard to find; price regulation is on its way
out and market forces, aided by OPEC, are encouraging domestic
exploration and development. But, while the themes of classic oil
and gas law are Mozartean, not all of the players can perform at the
standard required. Some of the cases discussed in this symposium
reflect an inability by courts to deal effectively, much less
artistically, with the material before them.
For example, there is Gilbertson v. Charlson.I The issue before
the North Dakota court was the construction of a deed that on its
face purported to convey the surface and minerals in Blackacre less
fifty percent of the minerals. 2 If counsel had handed the judges the
deed, and nothing but the deed, they would, I wager, have
unanimously agreed that indeed grantee received fifty percent of
the minerals under the deed. But the land records revealed, and the
judges knew, that when grantors executed the deed they owned
only two-thirds of the minerals. 3 Then, upon evidence that the
grantee also knew what the grantors owned and upon the further
assumption that with such knowledge the parties intended for
grantors to reserve the minerals they owned, the court held that
grantee did not obtain the fifty percent mineral interest purportedly
conveyed by the deed. 4 The court reached this conclusion in the
face of an earlier North Dakota decision reaching the opposite
5
result.
To North Dakota title examiners, the law on this question is
certainly not Mozart, not even Berg, but cacophony. No one would
object if the court had held that upon proper evidence the
instrument could be reformed to reflect the true intention of the
parties. But to hold as a matter of construction that, contrary to its
plain terms, the instrument did not grant fifty percent of the
minerals to grantee is to do what may or may not be justice in the
particular case, but may very well be injustice in a great many
other cases, at the fearful price of rendering unmarketable all
comparable titles with similar reservations.
A second case discussed in the symposium, Mitchell v. Amerada
Hess Corp., 6 presents a classic question of oil and gas lease law, but
deals with the matter in something less than the grand manner. The
1. 301 N.W.2d 144 (N.D. 1981).
2. Gilbertson v. Charlson, 301 N.W.2d 144, 145-46 (N.D. 1981).
3. Id. The facts are simplified above, as each grantor owned one-third of 95% of the minerals.
Id. at 145.
4. Id. at 148.
5. Id. at 147-48. See Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971).
6. 638 P.2d 441 (Okla. 1981).
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issue was whether a lessor could obtain cancellation for failure to
drill exploratory wells. 7 The court said no, not because under all
the circumstances no relief was deserved, but because no duty
exists. 8 In an area in which the facts are of paramount importance,
as earlier Oklahoma cases made clear, 9 the court recites one fact
only: the lessor failed to prove that the lessee would have made a
profit on its investment in the well. 10 Profit is the key concept, and
even on that question the court waffles. A carefully drafted opinion
would have taken one of two tacks. It would have reviewed all the
facts and concluded under the circumstances that the asserted
breach did not come within the boundaries of liability staked out by
the numerous earlier Oklahoma decisions. Or it would have
reviewed those decisions and concluded, for good reasons given,
that they were wrong and that under no circumstances could a
lessor prevail unless he proved that the claimed well would be
profitable.
A third case, decided too late to be discussed at the
symposium, shows the inability of the courts, on some occasions, to
deal with classical issues in the light of new developments. In
Cosgrove v. Young" the Kansas Supreme Court applied the Rule
Against Perpetuities to a perpetual, nonparticipating royalty,
causing its destruction and the total loss of bargain by the royalty
owner.' 2 Some twenty-eight years ago I sought to demonstrate that
the policy of the Rule was promoted, not offended, by upholding
the validity of these interests. 3 Courts considering the issue
thereafter uniformly sustained the interests. Those cases were not
cited or discussed in the court's opinion. The implications of the
two Kansas cases in point,' 4 decided a generation ago, were driven
to a brutal conclusion to the total exclusion of all other thinking on
the subject. If the Kansas court had taken the more pragmatic
approach that has characterized some of the best thinking of
classical oil and gas law, it would have asked itself why the people of
Kansas should be denied the privilege of creating and trading
perpetual royalty interests, especially when citizens in all other
producing states have that privilege. There may be a good answer
to that question, but no one has found it.
7. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp., 638 P.2d 441, 446 (Okla. 1981).
8. Id. at 449.
9. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW 5 845.5 (1981).
10. 638 P.2d at 446-47, 449.
11 .__
Kan. __
, 642 P.2d 75 (1982).
12. Cosgrove v. Young, __
Kan ..
,
-,
642 P.2d 75, 83-84 (1982).
13. 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL & GAS LAW S 323 (1981).

14. Lathrop v. Eyestone, 170 Kan. 419, 227 P.2d 136 (1951); Miller v. Sooy, 120 Kan. 81, 242
P. 140 (1926).
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Though one can criticize contemporary decisions on classic
issues of oil and gas law, as I just have, I hope enthusiasm for the
revival of this body of law remains unimpaired. As this symposium
demonstrates, it is interesting law, it is important law, and it is
worth taking time to think about.

